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The Mussa Theorem (and Other Results 
on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard)
OLIVIER JEANNE and JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER*
Using a simple model of international lending, we show that as long as the IMF lends
at an actuarially fair interest rate and debtor governments maximize the welfare
of their taxpayers, any changes in policy effort, capital flows, or borrowing costs
in response to IMF crisis lending are efficient. Thus, under these assumptions, the
IMF cannot cause moral hazard, as argued by Michael Mussa (1999 and 2004).
It follows that examining the effects of IMF lending on capital flows or borrowing
costs is not a useful strategy to test for IMF-induced moral hazard. Instead, empiri-
cal research on moral hazard should focus on the assumptions of the Mussa theorem.
[JEL F32, F33]
I
t must have been sometime in January or February of 1999, when Mike Mussa,
sitting in his office on the tenth floor of the IMF headquarters building, remarked
to us that if IMF loans were always repaid, there was obviously no way that the
IMF could be a source of moral hazard.
We nodded our heads respectfully but did not really believe him. Clearly, it
could not be as simple as that. Whether or not they were repaid, IMF loans made
crises less unpleasant for countries, so they created an incentive to be less careful
about avoiding them in the first place. That was moral hazard, wasn’t it—like fail-
ing to install fire detectors in the presence of fire insurance? Mike’s observation,
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countries. But what about international investors whose reckless lending behavior
had contributed to the crises? They were let off the hook with the help of IMF cri-
sis lending. There had to be “investor moral hazard,” which Mike’s claim seemed
to ignore altogether.
But who was to contradict such an authority in international economics, who
also happened to be the author of a pathbreaking early contribution to the theory of
moral hazard and adverse selection, not to mention our boss? So, rather than engag-
ing him in an argument there and then, we went down to the second floor cafeteria
and thought about it.
By the time we were back in his office, in one of our meetings with Mike and
Alexander Swoboda on a paper that we were writing at the time, we realized not only
that Mike was right, but that his “theorem” was far more meaningful than we had first
thought. In particular, Mike was making a much stronger point than the usual argu-
ment that IMF lending provided desirable insurance at a justifiable cost to incentives
and thus did not generate “excessive moral hazard.” Larry Summers, for example,
had on many occasions compared the IMF to a fire brigade, arguing that although
fire brigades were undoubtedly a source of moral hazard, everyone agreed they
were a good thing. In contrast, Mike was pointing out that—under some conditions,
which he believed were generally met—IMF assistance quite literally created no
moral hazard. According to Mike, in the circumstances under which the IMF lends
(or should be lending), there is no trade-off between insurance and incentives. To
the extent that governments or investors adjust their behavior in the presence of the
IMF “safety net”—say by lending more, at lower interest rates, or by monitoring
less—this will be efficient and desired under the conditions of Mike’s theorem.
But what are these conditions? In essence, the Mussa theorem holds if IMF
lending occurs at no one’s expense. In particular, it must not occur at the expense of
IMF creditor countries and their taxpayers. This would be the case if the IMF were
to provide transfers, rather than loans; hence Mike’s insistence that IMF loans take
place under adequate safeguards, and that the terms of IMF lending reflect the repay-
ment risk faced by the IMF. But IMF lending must also not occur at the expense of
the taxpayers in the borrowing countries, which are ultimately the source of IMF
repayment. This point had been left implicit by Mike, who had assumed that coun-
tries acted like a single agent, or were ruled by benevolent governments. Our con-
tribution to the Mussa theorem was to persuade Mike to make this assumption
explicit. In this form, the “theorem”—in words—made it into our joint paper (Mussa
and others, 2000). This was an extensive treatise on international financial archi-
tecture, which turned out to be so long and mind-numbingly even-handed that Rudi
Dornbusch, our discussant at the conference when it was presented, accused it of
“reading like a report by the Council on Foreign Relations.”
Thus buried, it is perhaps no wonder that the Mussa theorem did not make
much of an initial impact. Mike himself stated his point in two subsequent papers
(Mussa, 1999 and 2004), and we for our part tried on at least one occasion (Jeanne
and Zettelmeyer, 2001). But as far as we can see, it has still failed to win many
converts, and basic misunderstandings on the welfare effects of IMF lending and
the conditions under which it creates moral hazard continue to plague the litera-
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namely, as a tight, formal link between assumptions and results. The objective
of this paper is to fill this gap. With this out of the way, one can have a useful dis-
cussion on whether the assumptions underlying the Mussa theorem are likely to be
satisfied or not—and if not, how IMF lending policies would need to be structured
to make them hold.
In this paper, we develop the theorem in the context of a simple model of IMF
lending. We begin by showing that even in a model in which moral hazard is ruled
out by construction—in the sense that outcomes are independent of any effort vari-
ables—the presence of IMF lending will lead to symptoms that are commonly asso-
ciated with moral hazard—namely, an increase in capital flows and a decline in risk
premiums. We then introduce policy effort and show that under the assumptions of
the Mussa theorem, any reduction in effort as a result of IMF lending is efficient
and hence does not constitute moral hazard in the usual sense. Finally, we discuss
how moral hazard arises when the assumptions of the Mussa theorem are violated.
We also explore the implications of the theorem for the empirical literature on
moral hazard and for IMF lending policy. The main contribution here is to point
out that virtually all empirical “tests of moral hazard” that have been proposed
in the literature miss the point, because they test for symptoms of insurance that
arise—assuming that IMF lending is effective—regardless of whether moral hazard
is present. Instead, we advocate an approach that focuses on testing the assumptions
of the Mussa theorem directly.
I. A Simple Model of the IMF
Our analysis is based on a simple model in which the IMF may lend to countries
that are unable to roll over their external debt with private investors. We look at
the impact of IMF lending not only ex post (at the time of the crisis) but also ex
ante, on the equilibrium of the credit market. The question is whether IMF bailouts
distort the behavior of international investors or the domestic authorities in a way
that could be characterized as moral hazard.
Assumptions
Consider a large number of identical emerging market (capital scarce) countries.
The rest of the world is populated by investors from rich countries. We denote by
W the wealth of foreign investors per emerging market country.
There are three periods, t = 0, 1, 2. The representative emerging market coun-
try invests k in period 0; this yields an output y =θ k in period 2, where the pro-
ductivity parameter θ is stochastic. The total cost of investing k is k + f(k), where
f(.) is increasing and convex.
A signal about the level of future output is observed in period 1. For simplic-
ity, we assume that the signal is perfectly informative, that is, agents observe θ in
period 1. The probability distribution function of θ is denoted by g(z).
Emerging market countries have no wealth in period 0, so investment must be
financed by borrowing abroad. We assume that k is financed by short-term debt
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denoted by d. This debt is held by a continuum of atomistic foreign investors who
have liquidation rights in period 1. A creditor who is not fully repaid in period 1 can
liquidate a small fraction of the investment, subject to a sequential service constraint.1
The total liquidation value of the investment is λθk with λ < 1, implying that
liquidation is never efficient.
In period 1 the country has no income and must roll over its short-term debt by
issuing new debt maturing in period 2. The country can pledge (credibly promise
to repay) a fraction α of its output to the new lenders. This fraction is lower than 1
because of limited contract enforcement (as in the sovereign debt literature), or
debtor moral hazard (as in Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998).
The utility of any agent (that is, residents of emerging market countries as well
as foreign investors) is given by
The residents of an emerging market country have no income in periods 0 and 1,
and consume in period 2 only. Their welfare, thus, is equal to their expected final
consumption (period 2 output minus debt repayment). International lenders are risk
neutral and lend provided that the expected return is nonnegative. There is a zero-
return safe technology allowing investors to store their wealth between periods. We
make the following assumption, which will be one of the two pillars supporting our
main result on IMF-induced moral hazard (the Mussa theorem).
Assumption A1. The emerging market country is run by a benevolent policy-
maker who chooses k to maximize the welfare of the representative resident.
The equilibrium is characterized by a pair (k*, d*) that maximizes domestic wel-
fare conditional on the participation constraint of foreign lenders. We define ex ante
(period 0) global welfare per emerging market country as the sum of the welfare of
the representative resident, U0, and of the foreign lenders, V0:
We will be interested in the question of how IMF bailouts affect the welfare of
debtor countries and their lenders, taking into account their possible effect in terms
of moral hazard. But first, let us look at the equilibrium when there is no IMF—
that is, in a situation of complete laissez-faire.
Laissez-Faire
There is a rollover crisis if the debt coming due in period 1, d, is larger than the
output that the country can pledge to private lenders, αθk. We assume that in this
case, a coordination problem between creditors makes them run for the exit, and
the investment is completely liquidated. Hence, one of the following two things
GW U V 00 0 =+ .
Uc cc = ++ 0 12 .
1This debt structure can be endogenized (see, for example, Jeanne, 2004). We take it as given in this
paper.
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liquidation (if d > αθk).





defined as the minimum level of productivity at which debt d can still be serviced,
given a level of investment k,
The zero-profit condition for lenders is (assuming that λ is so small that the payoff
that creditors derive from liquidation can be neglected on the right-hand side)
Equation (2) says that the real interest factor, 1 + r ≡ d/k, is inversely proportional
to the equilibrium probability of repayment.
Combining equations (1) and (2) to substitute out d and k, one obtains
We assume that this equation has solutions θ
–lf. As shown in Figure 1, equation
(3) may have several solutions, in which case the economically relevant solution is
1 3 = ()
+∞
∫ αθ θ θ
θ gd .( )
kd g d = ()
+∞
∫ θθ
θ .( ) 2
dk =α θ .( ) 1
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2In addition there could be self-fulfilling rollover crises. For simplicity we leave this possibility aside. It
could be added, however. Considering liquidity crises in which the IMF lends in last resort would strengthen





Figure 1. Equation (3)the lowest one. Importantly, this solution depends on the level of α, that is, the degree
to which output can be pledged for repayment. Increasing α shifts the curve upward
in Figure 1 and so decreases θ
–lf. The integral on the right-hand side of equation (3)
increases, and so the equilibrium interest rate rlf =αθ
–lf − 1 is decreasing with α. Note
that the interest rate r does not depend on k. This property, which comes from the lin-
earity of the production function, simplifies the algebra a great deal.
The welfare-maximizing level of k, denoted klf, is the solution to
implying
In the laissez-faire equilibrium, the debtor country’s welfare is given by
Because in equilibrium investors demand a zero expected return on their wealth,
their ex ante welfare is simply
implying the following expression for global welfare (per debtor country):
Global welfare is equal to the net surplus of the investment in the emerging mar-
ket country plus the wealth of investors. Notice that global welfare is lower than the
first-best level, defined as the level that would arise if the country could raise foreign
capital through an equity contract that removes the risk of liquidation by promising
foreign investors a share of domestic output rather than a fixed repayment.3 In that
case, there would be no liquidation, and global welfare would be given by
with kfb given by
1+ ′() = ( ) fk E
fb θ .
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3There are two sources of inefficiency in this model. First, there is the risk of liquidation, which can be
removed by equity-like contracts in which creditors are promised a share of the final output y (for example,
long-term GDP-indexed bonds, as proposed by Borensztein and Mauro, 2004). Second, there is the fact that
the country cannot pledge all its output but only a share lower than α. This could result in credit rationing
in the international financial market even if the equity-like contracts mentioned above were possible. The
share of output pledged to foreign investors may have to be larger than α to avoid credit rationing and reach
the first best level.
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than the level under laissez-faire. Capital flows are inefficiently low under laissez-
faire because of the liquidation risk, which reduces the expected productivity of the
investment.
Effects of IMF Lending
We now introduce the IMF, an institution that collects funds from international
investors (or, equivalently, rich countries that tax international investors) in period 0
and may lend them to emerging market countries with rollover crises in period 1. We
assume that in period 2 the Fund’s assets are redistributed to its financiers in pro-
portion to their contributions.
We assume that in period 1 the country can pledge a fraction β of its output
to the IMF, where β is in general different from α. In the remainder of this paper,
we assume that β > α. In other words, in this paper we interpret the critical dif-
ference between the IMF and private lenders as being that the maximum repay-
ment that the IMF can extract from a country, as a fraction of output, is higher
than for private creditors.4 Countries are willing or able to sacrifice a larger frac-
tion of their output to repay the IMF than they are to repay the private sector. This
could be because of IMF conditionality or because the IMF can punish default-
ing countries more severely than private creditors can. As a result, the IMF may
be able to lend in some rollover crises, without incurring a loss, when private
lenders cannot.
We assume that although it is a monopoly, the IMF lends at the actuarially fair
interest rate (that is, it does not extract any monopolistic rent from crisis countries,
and its expected profit is zero). This implies that investing in the IMF provides the
same return (zero) as investing in the debt market, and that the creation of the Fund
leaves the welfare of rich-country investors unchanged. Whether, as an empirical
matter, this is a realistic assumption will be discussed in the next section.
Assumption A2. The IMF lends at the actuarially fair interest rate.
The IMF lends under the same conditions as private lenders would if they
could extract βy from a country, instead of αy. The equilibrium in period 0, hence,
is the same as if private creditors had a power of extraction β. (It does not matter
to period 0 lenders whether their claims will be rolled over with public or private
money, provided that they are repaid.) Then the equilibrium relationships remain
(1) and (2), except that α is replaced by β.
Because θ
–
is decreasing with α, β > α implies that the liquidation threshold
is lower with the IMF, θ
–imf < θ
–lf. The IMF, therefore, lends in equilibrium to coun-
tries with θ in the range [θ
–imf, θ
–lf], that is, to countries that are not solvent enough
to roll over their debts with private creditors but are solvent enough to borrow
from the Fund.
4Another critical difference between the IMF and individual private lenders might simply be its size,
which enables it to overcome coordination problems (see Jeanne and Zettelmeyer, 2005). We do not high-
light this because we ignore self-fulfilling crises in this paper.
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the following three cases:
• If θ≥θ
–lf, the country can roll over its debt with private lenders, and the IMF does
not lend;
• If θ∈ [θ
–imf, θ
–lf], the country repays its debt with an IMF loan—the IMF bails out
private creditors; or
• If θ< θ
–imf, the IMF lets the rollover crisis result in a liquidation of the investment.
It is important to note that under our assumptions, an IMF bailout does not
involve a transfer of resources from the rest of the world to the debtor country or
the private investors who are bailed out. The IMF lends at an interest rate that
reflects the risk of default on its loans. The IMF, thus, does not take more credit
risk than a perfect lender of last resort. The IMF is different, however, from a
lender of last resort, since it lends to countries that are insolvent (and not only
illiquid) on their debt to private creditors. These countries are solvent on their debt
to the IMF because of the latter’s superior ability to extract repayment.
Replacing θ
–lf with θ
–imf in equation (5) gives the equilibrium level of capital,
kimf. It is larger than klf but remains smaller than the first-best level kfb.
The presence of the IMF produces the symptoms commonly associated with
“investors’ moral hazard.” Specifically, the anticipation of IMF bailouts
• Increases capital flows to emerging market countries (kimf is larger than klf); and
• Lowers the interest rate at which these countries can borrow abroad (rimf is smaller
than rlf).
However, there is no moral hazard stricto sensu in this model. In law and eco-
nomics, moral hazard refers to the risk that one party to a contract can behave to
the detriment of the other party once a contract has been concluded. Moral hazard
requires a hidden action. For example, Kreps (1990, Chapter 16) defines the prob-
lem of moral hazard as one in which “one party to a transaction may undertake
certain actions that (a) affect the other party’s valuation of the transaction but that
(b) the second party cannot monitor/enforce perfectly.”
Because there is no hidden action in our model, there cannot be moral hazard
stricto sensu. The larger capital flows and lower interest rate are the reflection of
optimal insurance, not moral hazard. As noted by Tirole (2002, p. 42), “Even
assuming that investors invest in expectation that official or taxpayer resources
will be available for bailouts, the notion of over lending moral hazard . . . is, as it
stands, puzzling. Investors are motivated by profit and react to the incentives
given to them. . . .”
This point seems to be misunderstood in many discussions of IMF-induced
moral hazard (in particular those that emphasize “investors’moral hazard”). These
discussions tend to confuse the nondistortive impact of insurance on the equilibrium
of the credit market with the possibly (but not necessarily) distortive consequences
of insurance.
Insurance that does not generate any distortion is optimal. Under the assump-
tions we have made so far, the presence of the IMF unambiguously increases the ex
ante (period 0) welfare of all agents. It leaves the welfare of rich-country investors
unchanged, and it strictly increases the welfare of the residents in emerging market
countries. More formally, in the presence of the IMF global welfare per country,
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Having looked at the impact of IMF lending on capital flows and interest rates, let
us now focus on moral hazard on the side of the borrower, that is, the incentives
of the domestic policymaker to take actions that reduce the probability of a crisis.5
We now assume that the distribution of θ is a function g(e, z), where e is a policy
effort that costs h(e)k to the representative resident (with h(z) increasing and con-
vex). Increasing the effort raises the probability that θ will be above any given
threshold, that is,
One question is whether the policy effort is decided at the same time as, or
after, foreign investors lend to the country—that is, whether the country can com-
mit to the effort level in the context of its relationship with private lenders. If com-
mitment were not possible, e would be a hidden action in the relationship between
the country and private lenders, and the debt contract would be affected by debtor
moral hazard. Because we are interested in moral hazard specifically generated by
IMF lending, we first look at a situation in which this brand of debtor moral haz-
ard is absent. We assume, therefore, that the country can commit to e at time 0,
when it borrows from private investors.6
Under laissez-faire, the threshold in θ triggering a rollover crisis is still given
by equation (3),
which, using (6), implies that θ
–lf is a decreasing function of e,
Raising e shifts the curve upward in Figure 1 and so lowers the intersection θ
–lf.
Other things being equal, increasing the effort reduces the default risk premium
and, consequently, the interest rate. Higher effort thus reduces the probability of a cri-
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5This could be extended to a setting in which we also introduce some crisis prevention action by
investors.
6As we shall see below, the results can be generalized to the case without commitment at the cost of
a plausible additional assumption.draw θ, and indirectly, by reducing the interest rate and thus the ex post burden of
the debt. Under laissez-faire the country’s ex ante welfare is given by
where we have used the fact that the expected repayment to lenders must be equal
to k.7 The country sets the effort level to maximize (7). The optimal effort under
laissez-faire is thus the solution to the problem
With the IMF, the country’s welfare and optimal effort would be given by (7)
and (8), in which θ
–lf (e) is replaced by θ
–imf (e). Does the presence of the IMF increase
or reduce the domestic policy effort? As shown by Corsetti, Guimarães, and Roubini
(2003) and Cordella and Levy-Yeyati (2004), the answer to this question is ambigu-
ous in general. The expectation of IMF bailouts could decrease or increase the level
of effort.
This question can be studied in a specification of our model. For simplicity,
let us assume that θ can take just three values, θl, θm, and θh, with
For the sake of argument, we assume that the values of the parameters are such
that under laissez-faire, there is a rollover crisis if the state is low or medium, and
that the superior enforcement technology of the IMF allows it to rescue a country
if the productivity state is medium (but not if it is low). That is,
The probability of a particular state s = l, m, h is denoted by p(e, s). First, let us
assume that effort shifts probability from the medium to the high state. More specif-
ically, the probability of the low state, pl, does not depend on e; the probability of
the medium state is (1 − pl)(1 − e); and the probability of the high state is (1 − pl)e.
Then, applying equation (8), the effort levels with and without the IMF are given by
from which it follows that the level of effort is lower with the IMF,
ee
imf lf < .
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7Here we use the fact that the country can commit to its effort level at the time the debt contract is
signed. Thus, the nominal repayment d is adjusted to e at time 0 to keep the expected repayment equal to k.
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the high state rather than the medium state. Without the IMF, the only way of
avoiding a rollover crisis and inefficient liquidation is to end up in the high state.
With the IMF, however, the country is protected from a rollover crisis in the medium
state. Hence the incentive to apply effort to avoid the medium state is higher with-
out the IMF.
Note, however, that this result can easily be reversed by changing the assump-
tions on the way in which the state probabilities depend on the level of effort. For
example, let us assume that the probabilities of the low, medium, and high states
are given by (1 − ph)(1 − e), (1 − ph)e, and ph, respectively. The effort shifts prob-
ability from the low state to the medium state, keeping the probability of the high
state unchanged. Now the efforts are given by
The level of policy effort is now higher with the IMF. In the absence of the IMF
the optimal effort is zero: the project is liquidated regardless of whether the low
or the medium state realizes, so there is no benefit to increasing the probability of
the medium state. With the IMF, by contrast, the project is liquidated in the low
state but not in the medium state, so that it pays to increase the probability of the lat-
ter. IMF bailouts now act as a prize inducing more effort, rather than as a cushion
reducing the punishment for low effort.
This ambiguity notwithstanding, it remains true that in our model, the antici-
pation of IMF bailouts may reduce the domestic policy efforts to avoid a balance
of payments crisis. This phenomenon is generally interpreted as “debtor’s moral
hazard.”
However, our model also shows that this interpretation is incorrect. Although
effort may indeed be lower in the presence of the IMF, this is not moral hazard in
the usual sense of reducing effort to a second-best level. Under the assumptions
made—in particular, A1 and A2—the IMF reduces the effort from a level that is
inefficiently high under laissez-faire. Without the IMF, the policy effort was too
high because the discipline provided by the market—the threat of liquidation in
the medium state—was excessively harsh. The presence of the IMF reduced the
level of effort from a second-best level to its first-best level (given the available
repayment technology β).8 In short, under the assumptions made, lower effort is
not the reflection of a distortion. It is simply an efficient response to an improved
repayment technology, much as faster driving may be an efficient response to better
roads, or the existence of airbags.9
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8Another way of seeing that there is no moral hazard stricto sensu in this model is that there is no hidden
action and, accordingly, no strict benefit to endowing the country with the ability to commit to action e (as
would be the case in a model with moral hazard).
9That is, assuming that the costs of having an accident are fully borne by the driver. This is the equiv-
alent of assumption A2, which rules out a transfer from the IMF to the country.Country and global welfare, furthermore, are strictly increased by the IMF.
Ex ante welfare is increased by the expected output loss that is avoided with
IMF bailouts,
Welfare is higher with the IMF for any levels of k and e. Thus, welfare must
be higher in equilibrium, irrespective of the IMF’s impact on the level of effort
or capital. Because the ex ante welfare of the country’s creditors remains equal to
their wealth W in equilibrium, the IMF also increases global welfare. These results
are summarized in the Mussa theorem.
Mussa theorem. Under assumptions A1 and A2, the anticipation of IMF
bailouts increases the volume of capital flows to emerging market countries
and reduces the cost of borrowing for these countries. In addition, the
anticipation of bailouts may decrease the domestic efforts to avoid a crisis.
However, the IMF does not generate moral hazard stricto sensu. The expec-
tation of IMF bailouts unambiguously increases the welfare of recipient
countries at no cost to the rest of the world.
Two Doors for Moral Hazard to Come Back
The logic behind the Mussa theorem is very strong. If IMF lending increases the
country’s welfare at no cost to the rest of the world, it cannot induce a distortion,
even if it might produce all the symptoms of moral hazard. However, this result
was obtained under two strong assumptions. We show in this section how relax-
ing these assumptions opens doors for moral hazard to come back.10
First, there was the assumption that the domestic decisions over k and e were
taken by a benevolent policymaker. Some, including Calomiris (1998), have
argued that IMF lending might aggravate the domestic distortions coming from
the fact that domestic policymakers are not, in reality, benevolent. The IMF,
according to this argument, might increase the scale of domestic expropriation in
emerging market economies because of its ability to extract more repayment from
the domestic taxpayers than private lenders could. Mike Mussa has referred to this
as “indirect moral hazard” (Mussa, 2004).
There are different ways this story can be told in our model. Probably the sim-
plest is to assume that the domestic policymaker maximizes his own utility rather
than the welfare of the representative taxpayer, and that he is able to divert a given










10We focus on the two assumptions that were highlighted as A1 and A2. In addition to these, it is possi-
ble to relax other assumptions in our basic model with the effect that the presence of the IMF might magnify
a previously existing distortion. For example, negative output externalities across countries might imply that
effort could be suboptimally low under laissez-faire. This might be aggravated by the IMF even if IMF lend-
ing does not contain a subsidy (see Weithöner, 2003). However, in a broader sense, this example confirms
the logic of the Mussa theorem—namely, that IMF lending cannot cause moral hazard unless lending occurs
at the expense of a third party that is not involved in the actual lending decision. In this case, there would be
an additional third party to consider.
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then, becomes “odious” in the sense of Kremer and Jayachandran (2002). One
can think of more indirect ways for policymakers to divert the domestic fiscal
resources toward specific groups (for example, providing implicit guarantees on
the liabilities of “crony capitalists”), but the logic of the argument would remain
essentially the same.
The objective of the policymaker, in that case, would simply be to maximize
capital inflows. Assume that the level of capital inflows is excessive because of a
malevolent policymaker under laissez-faire (that is, the welfare of the representa-
tive resident decreases with capital inflows). Then the IMF, by allowing the policy-
maker to attract even more capital inflows, could end up decreasing domestic
welfare.
Another way the IMF could induce a distortion is by lending at an excessively
low interest rate, which would imply a transfer from the IMF’s financiers to the
recipient countries (that is, assumption A2 is violated). In that case, the moral hazard
distortion would be of the same nature as that generated by a deposit guarantee in a
domestic banking context. The fact that the cost of a crisis will be subsidized by a
third party (here, the financiers of the IMF) may induce emerging market coun-
tries and their lenders to indulge in excessively risky behavior. In this case, those
who ultimately suffer from the distortion are not the domestic taxpayers in crisis
countries but the financiers of the IMF (presumably, the international taxpayer) who
lose part of their contribution to the Fund.
To make this point formally, we revisit the first specification of the three-states
model (in which the effort shifts the probability from the medium state to the high
state). Let us assume that an IMF bailout in the medium state involves a subsidy
(a transfer from the IMF to the rescued country) of size σ ≤ dimf. (The transfer is
equal to dimf if the country never repays anything to the IMF, but it cannot be larger.)
Now the effort levels with and without the IMF are, respectively, given by
The subsidy reduces the effort by making the medium state more attractive
relative to the high state. But in this case, it reduces the effort below the first-best
level (which is achieved in the absence of subsidy). The IMF, therefore, reduces
the effort from a laissez-faire level that is too high to a level that is too low. It
increases the welfare of the emerging market countries but reduces the welfare
of the rest of the world, and it could decrease welfare as a whole, if the subsidy
σ is large enough.
There is also a third potential door by which IMF-induced moral hazard might
potentially come back. If the policy effort of the government were a hidden action,
IMF lending could potentially aggravate the moral hazard that is introduced in the
original debt contract by the country’s inability to commit to e. However, it is easy
to see that IMF lending might reduce the country’s welfare in this way only if it
increased the interest rate at which the country can borrow ex ante.
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76Now the country sets its effort level after it has borrowed k at interest rate r.
The welfare of a country that has borrowed k at interest rate r is given by
under laissez-faire and by
with the IMF. The country’s welfare is higher with the IMF for any k, r, e, and it is
lower with r, given k and e. Assume that the country may borrow a given quantity
of capital k at interest rate rlfunder laissez-faire and at a lower interest rate rimf< rlf
in the presence of the IMF. Then, introducing the IMF in the laissez-faire equilib-
rium without changing the country’s level of effort unambiguously raises welfare,
The increase in the country’s welfare is even higher when the effort is set at the
optimal level given the existence of the IMF (e = eimf). Conditional on rimf < rlf,
therefore, the IMF necessarily increases the country’s welfare without changing
the welfare of investors. Global welfare can be lowered by the IMF only if IMF
lending has the effect of raising the country’s cost of borrowing ex ante—which,
paradoxically, most observers would interpret as the opposite of moral hazard.
Finally, to return to a point made above, it is worth noting that even when the
assumptions of the Mussa theorem are violated and the IMF does generate moral
hazard, this does not imply that this moral hazard is excessive. For example, it
could be that the domestic political agency problem is mild enough that on balance,
the IMF remains beneficial. Or it could be that the transfer in IMF lending is small
enough that the induced distortion does not reduce global welfare. However, in the
latter case, one has to worry about the redistributional consequences of IMF lend-
ing. The IMF does not induce a Pareto improvement in global welfare, since the
welfare of emerging market countries is increased at the expense of rich countries.
Some would say, of course, that this is redistribution in the right direction.
II. Implications of the Mussa Theorem
Implications for the Empirical Literature on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard
The Mussa theorem does not prove that there is no IMF-induced moral hazard. It
merely states conditions—which may themselves be quite restrictive—under which
IMF lending cannot give rise to moral hazard. However, as we have shown, even if
these conditions are satisfied, and there is no IMF-induced moral hazard, IMF lend-
ing will generally have implications such as increasing capital flows or lowering the
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77interest rates at which countries borrow—not because it creates moral hazard, but
simply because it makes the world a safer place.
The implications of this insight for the empirical literature on moral hazard are
quite profound. There is by now extensive literature that claims to “test for moral
hazard” by looking at the effect of actual or expected IMF lending on either coun-
try risk or capital flows (see, among others, Zhang, 1999; Lane and Phillips, 2000;
Dell’Ariccia, Schnabel, and Zettelmeyer, 2002; Kamin, 2002; Burkhalter, 2003;
Haldane and Taylor, 2003; Bai and Wei, 2005; and Zoli, 2004; see also Dreher,
2004, for a comprehensive survey and additional references). Without exception,
the tests performed in this literature are incapable of distinguishing whether the
effects of the IMF on market variables (to the extent that any are found) are a sign
of moral hazard or simply an indication that the IMF is doing its job. This is not
to say that these papers may not be valuable—clearly, the question of whether the
IMF has an impact on international capital markets in the direction predicted by
standard models (including models without any moral hazard) is an important one.
However, they are not tests of moral hazard.11
The same objection applies to a (much smaller) body of literature that looks at
the effect of IMF lending on debtor country policies from the perspective of testing
for moral hazard. For example, Dreher and Vaubel (2001) find that, controlling for
the state of a country’s economy, countries that had obtained IMF credit ran more
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies the less they had exhausted their bor-
rowing potential in the IMF and the more credit they had received. But it is the
intended purpose of IMF lending to allow countries experiencing balance of pay-
ments difficulties to run more expansionary fiscal and monetary policies than they
otherwise could. Whether this is efficient or a source of moral hazard depends on
whether in the absence of IMF lending monetary and fiscal policies would be in-
efficiently tight (as may well be the case if countries cannot smooth consumption
by borrowing in international capital markets) or whether IMF lending accommo-
dates, or indeed exacerbates, an expansionary bias on the part of the authorities.
This distinction cannot be made based on the existing literature.
A more fruitful strategy in “testing for moral hazard” is to examine whether
the assumptions of the Mussa theorem are satisfied. In particular, the Mussa theo-
rem establishes a precise empirical standard to determine whether IMF lending
contains a subsidy or not. Note that this standard differs markedly from the stan-
dard proposed by some IMF critics, which is to compare IMF lending rates with
market interest rates faced by the crisis countries to which the IMF lends. As stated
by assumption A2, avoiding moral hazard requires only that the IMF rate of charge
be high enough to cover the repayment risk faced by the IMF, which may be sub-
stantially lower—as a result of the IMF’s political clout or its ability to directly affect
a country’s solvency by imposing conditionality—than the risk borne by private
lenders. By this standard, does IMF lending carry a subsidy or not?
A first step in answering this question is to look at the rate of return that the
IMF has actually received in its lending to various groups of countries over the past
decades. To the extent that the IMF either charged subsidized interest rates or suf-
11In recognition of this point, Dell’Ariccia, Schnabel, and Zettelmeyer, 2002, as well as Bai and Wei,
2005, argue that they are only testing a necessary condition for moral hazard.
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international risk-free rate, and in this case, IMF lending would undoubtedly carry
a subsidy. Zettelmeyer and Joshi (2004) show that this is indeed the case for lend-
ing to low-income countries, which carried an average annual rate of return, in the
1973–2003 period, about 400 basis points below the rate that the IMF would have
received from lending the same amount to industrial countries at comparable
maturities. This largely reflects a combination of deliberately concessional lend-
ing and debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative. In contrast,
the spread between IMF rates of return and lending rates by industrial countries
has been approximately zero for upper-middle-income countries (the group usu-
ally referred to as “emerging markets”). This is not surprising given that, with the
exception of a few arrears cases in the 1980s, none of these countries have ever
defaulted on the IMF, and the interest rate charged by the IMF in lending to these
countries is calculated in terms of a spread over short-term money market interest
rates in industrial countries.
By this test, then, the IMF seems to have been lending at an actuarially fair
interest rate to emerging market countries. However, it is a fairly weak test, since
Zettelmeyer and Joshi’s exercise assumes that currently outstanding credit to the
IMF will be repaid in line with IMF repayment projections. Is this assumption jus-
tified? According to our earlier work in this area, the answer—perhaps surpris-
ingly—is “yes.” In Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2001), we compared the length of
currently open IMF “lending cycles” (uninterrupted periods of strictly positive
obligations to the Fund) with the length of lending cycles that had been fully
repaid in the past, using a maximum likelihood procedure to decide whether cur-
rently outstanding IMF loans “looked” like they would eventually be repaid.12 The
upshot of the exercise was that because there have been many long lending cycles
with emerging markets that eventually resulted in full repayment, the vast major-
ity of the currently open lending cycles to these countries (about 95 percent) were
predicted to be eventually repaid in full.
Like any exercise that focuses on the IMF’s repayment record, our 2001 char-
acterization of emerging market lending as virtually subsidy free is convincing only
if one assumes that the past is a good guide to the future. It is here that the potential
problem lies. On the one hand, the shift to large-scale crisis lending that began with
the 1995 Mexican loan does not seem to have constituted a structural break with
respect to the IMF’s repayment record: all large-scale crisis loans made between
1995 and 1999 have by now been fully repaid, or are well on their way to being
repaid.13 On the other hand, as Mike Mussa has argued on several occasions, more
recent large-scale loans, such as the loans to Argentina in late 2000 and 2001,
12More technically, we formulated a duration model in which the probability of observing an IMF lend-
ing cycle of length t was modeled in terms of the probability of either observing an “infinite lending” cycle
that would never be repaid or the probability of observing a “finite” cycle that had not been repaid yet but
would be repaid with some hazard rate. The probability of being in an “infinite” cycle and the parameters
of the hazard function were then estimated using the available data on the length of both completed and
incomplete cycles.
13Brazil’s 1998–99 loan had been largely paid off before it received new assistance from the IMF in
mid-2001. Indonesia’s obligations to the Fund peaked in September 2000 and have since declined by about
20 percent.
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79might be a different matter (see also Rogoff, 2002). What differentiates the loans
to Argentina is that they were made when Argentina already had substantial out-
standing obligations to the Fund, and that they were not made in response to a cap-
ital account crisis (as was the case for Mexico in 1995 and the Asian crisis loans) but
rather in response to fiscal problems that carried the risk of a capital account crisis.
When this crisis eventually materialized, it had an impact on all of Argentina’s
creditors, including the IMF. Thus, to the extent that this brand of large-scale
lending carries a higher risk of default than was typical for either standard lending
or large-scale crisis lending in the past, it would clearly imply a subsidy under cur-
rent lending terms and hence could be a source of moral hazard.
The other assumption in Mussa’s theorem is that debtor country governments
act in the best long-run interests of their taxpayers. One does not have to be a cynic
to doubt that this is the case. The question is how systematic the problem is in rela-
tion to IMF lending, that is, whether large-scale IMF lending has tended to go to
countries whose precrises policies, subsequent crises, adjustment, and repayment to
the IMF had the joint effect of redistributing wealth at the expense of the average
domestic taxpayer. One area of research related to this question is the distributional
effects of IMF programs (see Vreeland, 2003, Chapter 6). However, the literature
in this area has tended to focus narrowly on the effects of IMF conditionality, rather
than on the broader and more difficult issue of whether the combination of finan-
cial guarantees that primarily benefit a small financial and entrepreneurial elite,
although they are backed by the average taxpayer, has important distributional
effects. This could be the case even without any IMF conditionality. IMF-induced
moral hazard through this channel remains an underexplored and, in our view, crit-
ical area of empirical research.
Implications for IMF Lending Policies
From the perspective of avoiding moral hazard in IMF lending, the policy implica-
tions of the Mussa theorem are straightforward: avoid lending at terms and in cir-
cumstances that would lead to a violation of assumptions A1 and A2. How this can
be done in practice?
As far as avoiding implicit transfers in IMF lending is concerned, Mike Mussa
has argued—and we agree with him—that this would be achieved under the IMF’s
current interest charges provided that lending is “temporary” and takes place “under
adequate safeguards,” as envisaged in the Articles of Agreement. Indeed, the IMF’s
current rules imply that lending from its general resources (as opposed to deliber-
ately concessional lending funded through special facilities) should not contain a
transfer element. In particular, the IMF is allowed to lend only to countries that
will, in all likelihood, be in a position to repay the Fund in the medium term.
Furthermore, according to new guidelines issued in February 2003, the IMF is
allowed to lend in large amounts (exceeding the usual limit of 100 percent of quota
in any given year and 300 percent of quota in total) only when a “member is expe-
riencing exceptional balance of payments pressures on the capital account resulting
in a need for Fund financing,” when “a rigorous and systematic analysis indicates
that there is a high probability that the debt will remain sustainable,” and when
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the time Fund resources would be outstanding.” These guidelines are meant to
ensure that large-scale crisis lending—the suspected source of moral hazard with
regard to emerging market countries—remains temporary and that adequate safe-
guards are in place.
However, while most instances of large-scale IMF crisis lending since 1995
would have satisfied the 2003 guidelines, the most recent cases—ironically, the
only instances of large-scale crisis lending that took place after the guidelines were
issued—did not (see IMF, 2004). The reasons for this could reflect, in some com-
bination, the fact that these criteria were tailored too narrowly to the capital account
crises of the 1990s, a standard time-consistency problem—lending might be opti-
mal ex post even though refusing it is optimal ex ante—and, as Mike Mussa would
put it, “geopolitical concerns.” Regardless of the cause, this experience shows that
criteria that are meant to limit the circumstances in which large-scale IMF crisis
lending can occur could be violated. This could be a source of moral hazard.
Avoiding the “indirect moral hazard” that may arise when the IMF supports
governments that fail to act in the best interests of their taxpayers is conceptually
harder than avoiding a subsidy in lending. As Mussa has pointed out, it would
obviously go too far to refuse financial assistance to all but the most virtuous and
competent governments. From the perspective of avoiding IMF-induced moral
hazard, the key issue is not so much precrisis policy mistakes per se, but rather
whether the distributional implications of these mistakes—and thus the propen-
sity of governments representing special interests to commit such “mistakes”—
might be magnified by the prospect of IMF liquidity support. In those cases, the
IMF should not lend.
How can this be operationalized? For one thing, as Mussa has argued, the IMF
must not support “gambles for resurrection,” desperate precrisis measures that
benefit the government and the ruling elite by maintaining a possibility that the
crisis can be avoided, at enormous expense to the domestic taxpayer in the event
that the attempt fails. Others, including Peterson, Goldstein, and Hills (1999), the
International Financial Institutions Advisory Commission (2000), and ourselves in
our 2001 paper, would take a broader and more ambitious view of the desirable
link between precrisis policies and access to IMF lending, perhaps including the
level and structure of outstanding debt, its transparency with respect to data, the
quality of institutions regulating the financial sector, and its responsiveness to IMF
surveillance. Again, the key challenge in creating such a link in practice is to over-
come the time-consistency problem that it inevitably raises.
III. Conclusions
The Mussa theorem is a statement of conditions under which official crisis lend-
ing does not have adverse incentive effects. It is pivotal to understanding the wel-
fare implications of crisis lending as distinct from conventional forms of insurance
involving conditional transfers. Whether it holds empirically is an open issue—quite
possibly it does not. But this does not lessen its importance. Like the Modigliani-
Miller theorem, which undoubtedly does not hold, the contribution of the Mussa
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lectual benchmark. By defining the conditions under which IMF-induced moral
hazard cannot exist, it establishes a set of potential channels or mechanisms through
which moral hazard could in fact arise in practice.
The Mussa theorem has important implications for the empirical literature on
IMF-induced moral hazard. By pointing out that lower borrowing costs or larger
capital flows are the expected consequence of any crisis-lending mechanism,
regardless of whether it leads to moral hazard, it implies that the standard “test for
moral hazard” used in the empirical literature is not meaningful. What this litera-
ture does is test whether IMF crisis lending has effects on international capital
markets in the direction that most models of the IMF would predict—with or with-
out moral hazard. The same applies to papers that observe that IMF lending allows
countries to run more expansionary policies than they otherwise could. This may
be the intended consequence of IMF lending and is not proof of moral hazard. How-
ever, the Mussa theorem is also constructive: it suggests an alternative empirical
approach—namely, to test for the validity of its conditions directly.
In the policy arena, perhaps the most important contribution of the Mussa theo-
rem is to define, in precise terms, the meaning of a moral-hazard-inducing “subsidy”
in IMF lending. Time and time again, this has been a subject of misunderstanding,
with IMF critics arguing that IMF lending incorporates a subsidy at the expense of
creditor-country taxpayers to the extent that its interest charges are lower than
those charged by private borrowers (see Higginbotham and Schuler, 2002, for a
recent example). The Mussa theorem shows that this is an incorrect standard, except
in circumstances when the IMF faces the same default risk as private borrowers.
From the perspective of avoiding moral hazard, what matters is whether IMF
interest rates are actuarially fair in the sense that they cover the risk faced by the
IMF. This will generally be lower than that faced by private borrowers.
Finally, the Mussa theorem suggests that the IMF could be a source of moral
hazard to the extent that its lending amplifies preexisting moral hazard problems
in borrowing countries. In avoiding this source of moral hazard, the general princi-
ple must be to relate access to IMF financing to the quality of country policies and
institutions prior to the crisis. This is easier said than done, however, particularly
because it raises a time-consistency problem. Whether this problem can be dealt
with satisfactorily will determine the feasibility of incentive-friendly large-scale
lending in the future.
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